A real European identity in opinion polls?

The European identity has changed in the last two decades, caused principally by the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht (Stråth, 2002, p. 384). As Brigid Laffan analysed, the European Union has been deeply transformed: “the politics of identity have enormous salience in the new Europe and for the European Union at this juncture in its development because the Union is moving from issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions about its nature as a part-formed polity” (Laffan, 1996, p. 82). These changes have been structural within the European institutional framework but also cause upheavals in the social and institutional relations between European citizens amongst them and between European citizens, European institutions and national institutions. European identity has been disrupted and its characteristics have changed considerably. Several questions emerge such as: Has this upheaval really altered relations and identification of people living within the European Union? Does a European identity emerge? Has this been analysed correctly by opinion polls?

Firstly, the notion of European identity is diverse. Yves Bertoncini and Thierry Chopin separate the European identity into two different identities: “identity-otherness” and “identity-citizenship”. The former could be analysed as a “collective identity conceived on a historic and geo-cultural mode” and the latter as “resulting from an identification to a European law community” (Bertoncini & Chopin, 2010, p. 85; Bruter, 2004, p. 36). However, Eurobarometer and opinion polls have strong difficulties to measure the central elements of European identity and could not differentiate these two different kinds of European identities (Risse, 2004, p. 256). These two kinds of identity could not be measured by the same opinion polls. The former is more subjective than the latter. The cultural idea of identity is a sense of belonging more to a group, a nation with common particularities such as values, religion, and history with cultural identifiers whereas the civic idea of identity is based on a more political vision, more an idea of belonging to a same State, sharing common rights and duties, and being citizens of a same country or organisation.

            Moreover, Eurobarometers, created in 1974 and which is therefore contemporary of the concept of European identity – elaborated during the Copenhagen EC Summit in 1973 (European Commission, 1973) –, have a couple of methodological limits. As other polls on European identity and support of membership, these polls, even if they are dealing with European issues, are on national statistical methodologies: Eurobarometers are an addition of national polls. Furthermore, questions are seen as too narrow and the specificity of the questioning causes problems such as a reduction of the possibility for the polled to express his point of view and his complete feeling towards the question. Accordingly, the real impact of Eurobarometers for analysing the European identity is limited. (Bertoncini & Chopin, 2010, p. 358). Moreover, as Michael Bruter emphasises, Eurobarometers are seen as methodologically biased by many political scientists. In fact, Eurobarometers show defects by questioning on an irregular basis: firstly, polleds are obliged to take an arbitrary position between their national and European identities and this point refutes some recent political theories explaining that both of these identities can be linked as we will analyse hereinafter; besides, opinion polls do not ask questions on oneself identity but a predict response without a real attachment to a normative identification. (Bruter, 2004, p. 187)

            Secondly, European identity is not only divided into two different identities as we have studied previously but a double affiliation can also emerge and a multiple identity can be created. Different models of multiple identities exist and can be hard to analyse, especially with opinion polls. As Thomas Risse summarises, there are four different models of multiple identities: nested identities like ‘Russian Matruska dolls’, cross-cutting identities, separate identities, and eventually ‘marble cakes’ (Risse, 2004, pp. 250-251). The Russian dolls model explains the European identity on the principle that a social identity can fit into another social identity and so on; accordingly, on the long range, national identities will fit into a European identity. This model is seen as an element of the post-national theory. The second model emphasises the fact that some identities can have common elements but they are distinct; diversity and possible conflicts amongst members can occur. For the third model, identities are completely different and it is more a radical multiculturalist vision of European identity. The last model follows a constructivist vision of European identity, identities are tangled, each identity is interdependent and in solidarity with other identities. European identity cannot be separate from other identities and this union is changing constantly. Eventually, Eurobarometers cannot solve the problems of analysing such various definitions of European identity.

            Besides, other difficulties with the analysis of a European identity can be observed: identities are plural and heterogeneous. Opinion polls cannot show this sense of identification. One can have different loyalties and identities, for example a Swiss EU correspondent journalist working for an English newspaper is more European – because he works everyday with EU civil servants, EU lobbyists and other EU correspondents –, than Swiss – because he is a Swiss citizen –,  or than English – because he works and writes for UK nationals. Thomas Risse emphasises a particular argument, in his conclusion to his co-written book on transnational identities, that “most mass media opinion survey instruments, as well as the social psychological experiments, […] do not evaluate identification with Europe as cross-cutting with other social identities.” (Risse, 2004, p. 251). Indeed, a same person can reply with a certain way to an opinion poll or to a Eurobarometer and his answer cannot be observed as his real identity. Hierarchy of identities and more especially European identity is not a stable concept.

            Additionally, opinion polls and Eurobarometers follow a top-down approach of European identity. These methods of analysing feelings and identifications are ordered for Eurobarometers by the European Commission and for opinion polls by national governments, think tanks and other organisations. Consequently, their creation is subjective and with same facts, methodological elements can change the shape and the conclusion of a study. The question is therefore to know who the creators are, and what for and who for the poll is done. We have already analysed the creators and these opinion polls are principally read by EU officials, EU civil servants, MEPs and European Medias. A questionable bias could exist and a particular identity responding perfectly to the EU hope and fitting the best with the policy-making of European institutions is preferable: eight years ago, a Eurobarometer identified Israel: “as the biggest threat to world peace” (Euractiv, 2003) caused problems for the European Commission after protestations from the Israeli government, other governments, and think tanks and this question on threat to world peace was not questioned in same manner at another period. As we can observe, rankings, which are an important part of the survey and opinion polls, are sociologically subjective elements for judging; they are hierarchies where with one or several indicators, pollers try to give a specific value to a subjective self-feeling.

       Eventually, another limit on the estimation of the extent and significance of an emerging European identity is the difference of identification with Europe between elites and the other part of European population; Thomas Risse emphasises the social psychological concept of entitativity (Castano, 2004) to explain this fact. Indeed, this is: “The reification of a community resulting from increasingly shared cultural values, a perceived common fate, increased salience, and boundedness, which then lead to collective identification.” (Risse, 2004, p. 261). According to Emanuele Castano, there is not only one entitativity but two different communities which could reject themselves. The understanding of the EU and European institutions, policy-making is completely different; while the economic, social, cultural, and political elites can share common identifications and live a certain reality of Europeanness, The EU is not something tangible for the majority of European citizens.  In light of these observations, opinion polls and Eurobarometers, as we have analysed with the other methodological issues, are not able to identify the realness and the ambivalence of European identity.

       Even if we can define correctly and agree on certain identity characteristics, a problem is still present: the common values of this European identity relate to an identification to the European continent – a ‘real’ European identity –, to the EU – a Europunian identity –, or to the Western side of the world – a Western identity. In short, we can see with international organisations that this specificity can reflect large differences: the EU has only member states from the Western side of the Eurasian continent, but two other international organisations with the term ‘Europe’ included in their name have members in the Eastern side of the Eurasian continent and in the North American continent; respectively, the Council of Europe with for example, Russia and Azerbaijan and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe with for example, Canada, the United-States of America and Uzbekistan.

       Accordingly, the significance of European identity is not correctly studied but this is not the main concern as opinion polls are created to answer to a specific question from policy-makers. Unfortunately, decision-making in the European Union is based on a not entirely true image of European citizens. How could we feel part of the European demos while policy-makers base their public policy on suppositions and mirages?

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Bertoncini, Y. & Chopin, T., 2010. Politique européenne : Etats, pouvoirs et citoyens de l’Union européenne. Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques et Dalloz.

Bruter, M., 2004. Civic and Cultural Components of a European Identity: A Pilot Model of Measurement of Citizens’ Levels of European Identity. In: R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. B. Brewer, eds. Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 186-213.

Bruter, M., 2004. On what citizens mean by feeling ‘European’: perceptions of news, symbols and borderless‐ness. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(1), pp. 21-39.

Castano, E., 2004. European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective. In: R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. B. Brewer, eds. Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 40-58.

Euractiv, 2003. EU stunned by results of own opinion poll. [Online]
Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/security/eu-stunned-results-opinion-poll/article-112117
[Accessed 24 November 2011].

European Commission, 1973. Declaration on European Identity. In: General Report of the European Commission. Brussels: European Commission.

Laffan, B., 1996. The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(1), pp. 81-102.

Risse, T., 2004. European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?. In: R. K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. B. Brewer, eds. Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 247-271.

Stråth, B., 2002. A European Identity : To the Historical Limits of a Concept. European Journal of Social Theory, 5(4), p. 387–401.

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Photo credit : European Commission