A few weeks after the Lisbon Treaty came into force and initiated a new external policy instrument for the European Union, the earthquake in Haiti and more generally the Haitian situation would be a perfect first example of a European response. As the spokesman for Miss Ashton explained, the new European External Action Service would have been an opportunity to spread a European vision.
»It is the first time that all these actors have been
brought together, » said Lutz Gullner, spokesman for Ms. Ashton,
»and that such a coordination was done pulling
together all the strands making sure that all available
instruments can be used. » (Saltmarsh, 2010)
This article follows the main hypothesis that a window of opportunity has been missed by the European Union in order to contribute to the solution of the institution-building with the aim of creating a sustainable democracy: therefore, no direct Common Security And Defence Policy intervention was requested at this moment. Consequently, I will demonstrate this hypothesis touching on five important elements. These points are interdependent and the reasons or solutions have also an influence on other points. This will be evaluated from a perspective mixing three different examples: the Haitian earthquake and the difference between the United States of America and the European Union response; the new Brazilian role in Haiti and finally the failure of the UN mission MINUSTAH. I will consider the situation with an internal-oriented explanation followed by a study of the different external actors. Furthermore, I will try to enumerate the different causes to the actual situation.
As we can observe from the last events in Haiti with regard to the cholera epidemic and the presidency elections, problems in this country are not resolved. In fact, Haiti today is seen as a regional threat and a post-conflict country. Aside from this fact, Haiti’s history reveals a vicious circle of non-efficient foreign interventions. From 1804, the first-decolonised country has known French, Spanish and American interventions. The twenty last years was a succession of dictatorship or governments without a real legitimacy. Therefore, Haiti has been for the fifty last years a failed, a weak or a shadow state according to the specific academic literature. During the Duvalier period (from 1957 until 1986), Haiti, as a failed state, knew: “(a) [a] loss of control or failure is not always involuntary (states may decide that loss of control in some areas is acceptable); and (b) violence is not always a byproduct of the loss of control. On the contrary, violence can be a means of maintaining control, or attempting to maintain control, with the state as its main perpetrator. (Gros, 2011, p. 541)” And during the following period, Haiti was also defined with the same definition but for a different reason: “They lose control in parts, perhaps significant parts, of their territory, but maintain it in some areas. (Gros, 2011, p. 541)” Consequently, Haiti has a real problem and lacks a real institutional system. These first signs of difficulty remain even during the last decade of democracy.
After a quick internal look, we will define the external outlook over the present situation : Haiti has the advantage or the inconvenience of concentration the willingness of different international actors at the beginning of the new decade: in particular the European Union with the Lisbon Treaty reforms concerning the external aspects of the European Union policy, the United States of America with the need of an international legitimacy of the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, the United Nations Organisation, some Latin America countries directly or indirectly by the actions of regional associations as Brazil and finally some Free-Riders as Canada or Norway. Nevertheless, these actors, as we will later see, don’t have the same aims. While the European Union wants to play the role of donor without a direct intervention (Hirst, 2010, p. 4), Latin America countries priorities are to be involved in the MINUSTAH, this UN mission was decided in 2004 by the Security Council (Resolution 1542) on a Chapter VII basis – some 60 per cent of MINUSTAH troops are from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile – and to forget the humanitarian and civilian sides (Hirst, 2010, p. 5). This element is quite important as it was one of the reasons for giving the Chatham House Price in 2009 to the former President of the Federative Republic of Brazil Inácio Lula da Silva as a tribute to his role for spearheading the UN stabilisation mission in Haiti. Other quite important actors associated in our case are the NGOs; the European Union has played a role as their main fundraiser.
However, the two most important entities in our analysis are the United States of America and the European Union. Similarities exist in their intervention but several differences could be recognized. Their interventions are conditioned by several factors: “First, both are influenced in their response pattern by more or less the same security concerns, namely (semi-)authoritarian regimes in their neighbourhood and adversarial and/or threat-posing countries. Towards those countries, both actors are much more determined to respond to non-compliance. (Warkotsch, 2010, pp. 95-96)”
First of all, Common Security and Defence Policy interventions using UN missions as an intermediate structure has failed. While the creation of a Civilian Crisis Management by the European Union was formed with the intention of solving the UN problem in order to have a correct and rapid intervention means as the failure to create White Helmets (Pfister, 2009, p. 122), the European Union preferred not to use its own means on the Haitian field of action. The European Union acted and acts in three main preferred theatres of operations, closer to the European continent: Asia, Africa and Europe. However a different kind of Multilateralism could be a solution especially in this part of the world: cooperation with Latin America regional associations and local actors.
A second point was that France, one of the main countries in the European Union concerning the Common Security and Defence Policy domain, preferred not to get involved directly. France is anxious of being seen as a neo-colonial power. This country colonised Haiti from the 16th century to 1804 and since the independence, France has preferred not to intervene in this country. On the other hand, the European Union could be a way for France not to interfere directly with the Haitian problem as in Chad with the Common Security and Defence Policy operation EUFOR or in the African Great Lakes Region. The French strong history in Africa is whipping by the European mediation, and it could be the same in the other former French-colonised parts of the world. Moreover, on the other hand, as France does not want to intervene and even if: “The EU has increasingly become the institutional repository for the ‘second-order’ concerns of its member states; the above analysis also suggests that member states only allow the EU to act as such a repository so long as this does not conflict with their core national interests. (Warkotsch, 2010, pp. 96-97)”, the European Union is confronted by an inability to act in this geographic area without a direct help from France, and more especially the French military forces and the logistic support of the French territories in the surrounding area: the French West Indies.
A third point is that Haiti is not a political priority for the European Union; the European Union prefers to create a Common Security and Defence Policy operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo or in the Former-Yugoslav federation and most importantly with some difficulties to manage an efficient framework of intervention. In fact, the European face the problem of capacities – there were too many interventions in Africa, in Asia, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus or in the Middle-East and not enough men or projection capacities for the European Union to use. And a consequence of the two first points is that the available military capacities as the different European Battlegroups or the Eurocorps are not being sent to this theatre of operation. However, some capacities were sent to the UN civilian and military missions as UNPOL, MINUSTAH. Therefore, this European approach could be viewed as a Strategist approach, the European Union prefers to focus itself on certain strategic parts of the world where it could have a better efficiency ratio.
A fourth point is a direct consequence of the third one, the real European willingness was only to create a humanitarian intervention while the main and more important necessity was to have a Common Security and Defence Policy civilian and military operation to control the humanitarian operation and have an accountability on the financial resources sent by the different European Union funds and European Union members. This humanitarian intervention does not need the mobilisation of military forces of members of the European Union or of the European battlegroups; it is therefore seen as a good compromise in order to maintain at least one European intervention.
Finally, since the Doctrine Monroe, Haiti is seen as a part of the American sphere of influence – the United States of America intervened in Haiti just after the World War II – and for the European Union, it is really important to transcend this problem and to create a favourable precedent – Haiti as a previous French colony have strong links with Europe and a part of the Haitian diaspora live in Europe – with the purpose of intervening in Latin America countries as Salvador or Honduras. Moreover, an importance, complementary to the Doctrine Monroe, could be found in the American foreign policy to control countries in the Caribbean Area: “The US is affected more in its response pattern by neighbouring regimes and adversarial or threat-posing countries than is the EU. (Warkotsch, 2010, p. 97)”. Therefore, the European Union should, with regard to this particular point, follow a Conflict Researcher approach. The European Union has specific methods and means for solving the Haitian problem. However, such an intervention could be favourable for evolving the way in which different actors perceive and understand these types of problems and themselves.
A question can be asked? Has the vision of the European Union as a civilian power played a role in the European actions in Haiti? The different attributes of a Civilian power throw light on the third point: “Civilian power is exercised primarily for the benefit of those exercising it. (Manners, 2006, p. 174)” The Haitian situation wasn’t clearly a benefit to the European construction of a Common Security and Defence Policy framework and it couldn’t create a basis for future operations in this part of the world. And finally, in the case of the European Union, the real “[this] self-perception leaves the EU open to hypocrisy, as in practice the EU usually does not pursue its ethical agenda at the expense of vital national (security) interests. Moreover, Brussels rarely acts ‘civilian’, as it uses strong instruments of coercion like sanctions and aid reduction. (Warkotsch, 2010, p. 96)”
To conclude, there is a need for a new European Union intervention framework. Financial accountability should be a possible instrument for the European Union to build a new relation with countries like Haiti facing natural disasters or post-war situations. In our case, Haiti is well-known for a mismanagement of international funds. Concerning the UN missions in Haiti and their failure, some authors wrote that more coercive forces are needed but we can also determine the same concerning the European Union intervention: “In an environment characterized by extremely weak state institutions and self-serving local leaders, a more sustained and intrusive international presence is required. Building state institutions from scratch in a profoundly divided country take time and needs to be underpinned by a prolonged international security presence and stable flows of foreign aid. (von Einsiedel & Malone, 2006, p. 161)”
Bibliography
EUROPEAN COMMISSION – DG ECHO. (2010, October 01). Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission – Aid in action – Haiti earthquake. Retrieved January 03, 2011, from Humanitarian Aid department of the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/Haiti_paper_01102010.pdf
GROS, J.-G. (2011). Failed States in Theoretical, Historical, and Policy Perspectives. In H.-G. Haupt, W. Heitmeyer, A. Kirschner, & S. Malthaner, Control of Violence (pp. 535-561). New-York: Springer.
HIRST, M. (2010). What role for Latin America and Europe in Haiti? Oslo: Noref.
MANNERS, I. (2006). The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez. Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 167-180.
PFISTER, S. (2009). La puissance européenne et la gestion civile des crises. In F. Mérand, & R. Schwok, L’Union européenne et la sécurité internationale (pp. 109-123). Louvain-la-neuve: Bruylant-Academia.
SALTMARSH, M. (2010, January 16). Europe Sends Aid and Pledges Money for Haiti. The New York Times.
VON EINSIEDEL, S., & MALONE, D. M. (2006). Peace and Democracy for Haiti: A UN Mission Impossible ? International Relations(20), 153-174.
WARKOTSCH, A. (2010). Realpolitik and international reaction to non-compliance with Liberal Democratic norms: Comparing EU and US response patterns. Cooperation and Conflict, 45(1), 80-108.
Credits photo : F.de la Mure/MAEE, F.de la Mure/MAEE